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CLARIFYING THE NATURE OF LOUISIANA'S RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL IN THE TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLES"

Introduction
A right of first refusal, is "a right to buy before or ahead of

[anjother; ... thus, [the contract gives] to the prospective purchaser
the right to buy upon specified terms, but, and this is the important
point, only if the seller decides to sell." 2 Although this right in certain
ways resembles an option, there are at least two grounds on which the
two types of contracts clearly may be distinguished. First, unlike an
option, the right of first refusal "does not give the pre-emptioner the
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell." 3 Second, an option requires
a stipulated time period for its exercise, and a right of first refusal does
not. Despite the clear differences between these two contracts, Louisiana
courts have had difficulty in drawing the distinction. This article will
further explore that distinction in the context of the sale of immovable
property.
First, the inapplicability of the rules pertaining to options to a right
of first refusal will be analyzed. Second, some characteristics of Louisiana's right of first refusal will be considered. Finally, the jurisprudence
classifying the right of first refusal as an option will be scrutinized.
Distinguishing Between a Right of First Refusal and an Option
First of all it should be noted that the confusion in the jurisprudence
has not been over the enforceability of these contracts, but rather over
their characterization. 4 Professor Litvinoff's statement in his Civil Law
Treatise on Obligations that "the enforceability of a pacte de prference
is unquestionable" 5 is the prevailing view in Louisiana.6 The problem
is that the Louisiana courts at times have incorrectly characterized the

Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVEw.
1. The right of first refusal is also known as a right of pre-emption or a pacte de
preference.
2. 40 ALR 3d 920, 924.
3. Id.
4. Keene v. Williams, 423 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1983); Crawford v. Deshotels, 359 So.
2d 118 (La. 1978); Price v. Town of Ruston, 171 La. 935, 132 So. 653 (1931).
5. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 104, at 188, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
6.

653.

Keene, 423 So. 2d 1065; Crawford, 359 So. 2d 118; Price, 171 La. 935, 132 So.
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right of first refusal in the transfer of immovable property as an option, 7
and at other times held that the right of first refusal is not an option.'
Louisiana Civil Code article 2462 governs option contracts involving
the sale of immovable property. Specifically, the second paragraph addresses unilateral promises: 9
One may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject, within
a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the purchase
of such option, for any consideration therein stipulated, such
offer, or promise can not be withdrawn before the time agreed
upon; and should it be accepted within the time stipulated, the
contract or agreement to sell, evidenced by such promise and
acceptance, may be specifically enforced by either party. 0
Apparently, since a right of first refusal resembles an option, in
that both allow one party to purchase a particular thing from another
party at some point in the future, and since both are unilateral promises,
the courts have struggled to apply the second paragraph of article 2462
to rights of first refusal. The difficulty in applying those provisions to
rights of first refusal stems from the difference between the two contracts. A key characteristic of an option is a continuing obligation to
sell if the option-holder accepts within the stipulated time. In a right
of first refusal, however, the owner of the property is under no obligation
whatsoever to offer the property to the holder of the right. Indeed, the
property owner may decide never to sell the property. Further, it has
been said that "[tihe distinction is clear in that a [right of first refusal]
does not confer on the holder the power to compel an unwilling owner
to sell, while an option does grant such power to the optionee.""
Consequently, there is no "continuing right or option to accept (or
reject) an extant offer or promise to sell - as contemplated by article
2462." 12
Moreover, under Louisiana law an option contract must contain a
"stipulated time" within which the option must be exercised, or the
contract is void as against public policy. 3 Problems arise when the
7.

Price, 132 So. at 656.

8. Crawford, 359 So. at 122.
9. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 107, at 193, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 2462.
11. Boyer and Spriegel, Land Use Control: Pre-Emptions, Perpetuities and Similar
Restrictions, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 148, 154 (1965).
12. Crawford, 359 So. 2d at 122.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2462. The policy is one against holding property out of
commerce. Since an option of unlimited duration could perpetually deprive the owner of
the right to alienate his property, such agreements are invalid as contrary to public policy.
See Delcambre v. Dubois, 262 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Clark v. Dixon, 254
So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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courts attempt to apply the "stipulated time" requirement of article
2462 to rights of first refusal. Rights of first refusal involve not one,
but two time periods: the time between the formation of the contract
and the point at which the owner manifests his desire to sell; and the
time after the owner's offer to sell during which the holder must decide
whether or not to accept. Although the second time period more closely
resembles that involved in a option contract, the courts have favored
14
applying the "Stipulated time" requirement to the first time period.
In Price v. Town of Ruston, 5 for example, the Louisiana Supreme
Court applied the "stipulated time" requirement to a first refusal clause,
stating: "The stipulation limiting the time was that the option would
be available whenever the [owner] might desire to sell the property
''16

Since the owner who has granted a right of first refusal may never
decide to sell, for Louisiana Civil Code article 2462 to apply, it must
contemplate a point in time that commences upon the decision of one
of the parties only. Because that article clearly does not contemplate
such a time period, it appears that the court in Price misapplied it.
Nevertheless, the court's decision is still consistent with the policy behind
article 2462.18 Since the owner may sell the property at any time he
desires, the contract does not take property out of commerce, and the
reason for the "stipulated time" requirement is satisfied.
Justice Dixon in his concurrence in Crawford v. Deshotels,1 9 took
the position that the "point in time" analysis does not fairly interpret
2462:
C.C. 2462 clearly contemplates that an option will be for only
a "stipulated time," which I take to mean a time certain - a
day on the calendar or a day on which it is contemplated that
an event will occur which is not within the control of the person
20
granting the option.

14. Keene, 433 So. 2d at 1069; Price, 132 So. at 656.
15. 171 La. 935, 132 So. 653 (1931).
16. Id. at 656.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 13.
19. 359 So. 2d 118 (La. 1978).
20. Id. at 123 (Dixon, J.,concurring). Indeed, Delcambre v. Dubois, 262 So. 2d 96
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), supports Justice Dixon's view. In Delcambre, the plaintiff sought
specific performance under a contract granting him the right to re-purchase land from
the defendant. On original hearing the court invalidated the option as failing the "stipulated
time" requirement. While the court said that "the time of an option could be until the
occurrence of an event," when the occurrence of the event is entirely dependent on the
optionholder's future conduct the event is uncertain and violates the "stipulated time"
requirement.
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While Justice Dixon's interpretation is arguably correct from both
a textual and a policy standpoint when applied to options, it does not
comport with the policy behind article 2462 when applied to a first
refusal. This is so because that view would strike down a right of first
refusal although it does not unreasonably restrict the alienation of property, since the owner may sell at any time. The tension between an
appropriate literal application of article 2462 and fostering its policy
could be avoided by finding that, since a right of first refusal is not
an option, article 2462 simply does not apply. Moreover, the courts
may still be faithful to the Civil Code, by holding that a right of first
refusal is a valid innominate contract under Louisiana Civil Code article
1914.21

Characteristics of the Right of First Refusal
After concluding that a right of first refusal is not an option under
article 2462, but rather a valid innominate contract, some additional
characteristics of Louisiana's right of first refusal in the context of a
transfer of immovable property may be analyzed.
The basic structure of a first refusal contract is that "one of the
parties obligates himself to give the first choice to the other if he ever
decides to sell his property. ' 2 2 Thus, a first refusal is "a conditional
23
promise of sale," the condition being "the owner's desire to sell."1
24
This condition is not null even though it rests with the obligor. Thus,
initially neither party is really obligated to do anything, but rather the
owner has a negative duty-that is, he may not sell the property without
first offering it to the holder. The holder has no vested rights until the
property is offered to him; until then the right is merely contingent.
However, the complexion of the contract changes when the owner decides
to sell the property and offers it to the holder. At this point the contract
resembles an option. Once the offer is made, "the holder of the preemption does have the sole option to purchase and can compel the
'25
owner to convey or reconvey by an action for specific performance.
This leads to the problem presented by the time period within which
the holder may accept or reject the offer.
Once the complexion of the contract changes, the obvious concern
is whether the absence of a specified time for the holder to accept

21. La. Civ. Code Art. 1914: "Nominate contracts are those given a special designation
such as sale, lease, loan or insurance. Innominate contracts are those with no special
designation."
22. See Boyer and Spriegel, supra note 11, at 154.

23. See id.at 155.
24. See text accompanying supra note 5.
25. See Boyer and Spriegel, supra note 11, at 155.
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invalidates the contract under article 2462 as an option in perpetuity.
Keene v. Williams 26 addressed this issue and held that the failure to
specify a time was not fatal to the contract, since "there was in the
agreement an implied condition that Keene would be given a reasonable
amount 'oftime under the circumstances to either accept or reject the
offer." 7
The idea of implying a reasonable period of time for the exercise
of an option which fails to state a period of time is not new in
Louisiana. 2s Further, it has been said that "[s]uch a conclusion would
allow attainment of the same policy objectives but without overlooking
' 29
the parties' intent."
Another interesting attribute of a right of first refusal is the application of the ten year liberative prescription period established in
Louisiana Civil Code article 3447.30 In Roubichaux v. Boutte,3' the court
upheld a right of first refusal against an argument that the holders of
the right "had 10 years within which to exercise their right of first
refusal."32 Relying on the rule that "[flor liberative prescription to be
operative, a right or cause of action must exist in order for prescription
to run," ' 33 the court concluded that the right of action does not accrue
and prescription does not begin to run until the owner decides to sell.
The JurisprudenceConcerning Rights of First Refusal
There are only three Louisiana Supreme Court cases concerning the
characterization of a right of first refusal. 34 The earliest case on point
is Price v. Town of Ruston,3 in which Mrs. Price agreed to allow the
Elks' Lodge to construct a third story on a building that she owned.
The contract included a right of first refusal in favor of Mrs. Price.
The court upheld the contract as- an option against an argument that
it was invalid because it contained no stipulated time within which it
36
was to be exercised.

26. 423 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1983).
27. Id. at 1069, 1070.
28. This issue is explored in Note, The Requirement of a Definite Time Period in
Option Contracts, 34 La. L. Rev. 668 (1974).
29. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 104, at 108 (Supp. 1979).
30. La. Civ. Code art. 3447: "Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions
as a result of inaction for a period of time."
31. 492 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). See also Terrell v. Messenger, 428 So.
2d 1241, 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 709 (La. 1983).
32. Robichaux, 492 So. 2d at 527.
33. Id.
34. Keene v. Williams, 423 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1983); Crawford v. Deshotels, 359 So.
2d 118 (La. 1978); Price v. Town of Ruston, 171 La. 935, 132 So. 653 (1931).
35. 171 La. 935, 132 So. 653.
36. Price, 132 So. at 656.
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In Crawford v. Deshotels,a7 McDaniel conveyed half of her interest
in certain immovable property to Crawford under an agreement stating
that 'should [McDaniel] desire to sell [her remaining one half interest]
... [she] is herein obligated to offer to [Crawford] the first chance to
buy."' 38 The court rejected the contention that the contract was an
invalid option:
The article [2462] and the jurisprudence on which relator relies,
however, are not applicable here, for there is not here following
"the purchase of such option" - or in this case entry of the
contract - a continuing right or option to accept (or reject) an
extant offer or promise to sell - as contemplated by Article
2462. Rather there is here what is more commonly described as
a right of first refusal, or as the contract says, a right to be
afforded a "first chance to buy" at a price equal to any bona
fide offer which McDaniel should receive and be interested in
accepting. Thus, the stipulated time requirement of Article 2462
is not applicable.3 9
In other words, the court correctly distinguished a right of first
refusal from an option and accurately set forth why Civil Code article
2462 does not apply. However, the court contradicted itself in the next
paragraph by citing with approval Price and the language in that case
which assumes that a right of first refusal is a valid option with a
stipulated time. 40 The court then concluded that both of these reasons
supported the validity of the contract. Clearly the two theories are
mutually exclusive.
The most recent Supreme Court case on the subject is Keene.4 The
court cited Crawford for the proposition that the "right of first refusal
was valid under La.C.C. Art. 2462 which requires that an option have
a stipulated time within which it must be accepted or rejected." 42 It is
particularly interesting that the court went out of its way to make clear
its reliance on La. Civ. Code Art. 2462, since the court of appeals
43
expressly held that article 2462 did not apply.
The first circuit literally applied Keene in Travis v. Heirs of Felker,"4
by upholding a right of first refusal as a valid option. In Travis, the
court stated: "The Supreme Court has held the right of first refusal

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

359 So. 2d 118.
Crawford, 359 So. 2d at 122.
Id.
Id.
423 So. 2d 1065.
Keene, 423 So. 2d at 1069, n.2.
Keene v.Williams, 412 So. 2d 202, 205 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1982).
482 So. 2d 5 (La.App. 1stCir. 1985).
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enforceable as an option under article 2462 of the Civil Code despite
arguments that it states no specified time and that it is contrary to
public policy because it is a perpetual option. ' 45 The court cited the
trilogy of Supreme Court cases on the subject in support of this proposition.4 5 Although the court's classification of the contract as an option
was erroneous, the confusion is understandable.
Conclusion
The Louisiana courts have struggled to find codal authority for a
right of first refusal and in so doing have erroneously classified it as
an option under article 2462. The Supreme Court's statements in Crawford that a right of first refusal is not an option within the meaning
of article 2462 remain the most accurate expression in the Louisiana
jurisprudence of the distinction between the two contracts. The next
step in clarifying the precise nature of the right of first refusal is to
realize that its proper classification in the Civil Code is that of an
innominate contract. This characterization will avoid the necessity of
making strained interpretations of the "stipulated time" requirement of
article 2462 when the danger the rule is designed to guard against is
not present.
R. David Wheat

45.

Id. at 6.

